| ID |
CVE-2026-77776
|
| Sažetak |
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication. |
| Reference |
|
| CVSS |
| Base: | 9.1 |
| Impact: | 5.2 |
| Exploitability: | 3.9 |
|
| Pristup |
| Vektor | Složenost | Autentikacija |
| NETWORK |
LOW |
NONE |
|
| Impact |
| Povjerljivost | Cjelovitost | Dostupnost |
| HIGH |
HIGH |
NONE |
|
| CVSS vektor |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| Zadnje važnije ažuriranje |
21-08-2026 - 22:16 |
| Objavljeno |
21-08-2026 - 12:16 |
