| ID |
CVE-2026-71272
|
| Sažetak |
Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection. |
| Reference |
|
| CVSS |
| Base: | 8.5 |
| Impact: | 4.7 |
| Exploitability: | 3.1 |
|
| Pristup |
| Vektor | Složenost | Autentikacija |
| NETWORK |
LOW |
LOW |
|
| Impact |
| Povjerljivost | Cjelovitost | Dostupnost |
| HIGH |
LOW |
NONE |
|
| CVSS vektor |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N |
| Zadnje važnije ažuriranje |
05-08-2026 - 16:17 |
| Objavljeno |
05-08-2026 - 13:24 |
