| ID |
CVE-2026-55962
|
| Sažetak |
TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected. |
| Reference |
|
| CVSS |
| Base: | 6.5 |
| Impact: | 3.6 |
| Exploitability: | 2.8 |
|
| Pristup |
| Vektor | Složenost | Autentikacija |
| NETWORK |
LOW |
LOW |
|
| Impact |
| Povjerljivost | Cjelovitost | Dostupnost |
| NONE |
HIGH |
NONE |
|
| CVSS vektor |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
| Zadnje važnije ažuriranje |
27-06-2026 - 19:57 |
| Objavljeno |
25-06-2026 - 22:17 |